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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff andPetitioner,

)
)

V.

)
)

~

MARK C., et al.,

)

Defendants and Respondents.

)
)

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Appeal Froin the Judgment of the Superior Court
of the State of California, County of Orange
The Honorable Richard N. Parslow, Jr., Judge
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, Division Three
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
This is an action to determine who are the legal parents,
under the Uniform Parentage Act, California Civil Code sections
7000-7021, of a child developed from the sperm and egg of a

married couple, but who was carried and delivered by a
gestational surrogate.

On August 15, 1990, in the Orange County

superior Court, Mark and Crispina C. filed petitions to declare
the existence of a parent-child relationship between themselves
and their unborn child,
litem for the child,

(C.T. 8), and to appoint a guardian ad

(C.T. 1).

The trial court appointed the

C.'s guardians ad litem that same day.

(C.T. 64.)

On September

13, 1990, the trial court appointed William Steiner as an
independent guardian ad litem,

(C.T. 169), upon an August 27,

1990, motion by Anna J., the gestational surrogate,
and pursuant to stipulation,

(C.T. 136).

(C.T. 65),

The C.'s moved for an

award of interim custody upon the birth of the child on September
1

19, 1990.
1990.

(C.T. 234.)

This motion was granted on September 27,

(C.T. 334.)
On October 4, 1990, Anna J. filed a First Amended Complaint

for declaratory relief and petitioned for custody of the child
and for sibling rights for her natural daughter.
The suits were consolidated.

(C.T. 346.)

On October 22, 1990, the trial

court ruled from the bench without a jury that Mark and Crispina
C. are the child's genetic, natural, and legal parents.
1482-83.)

(R.T.

The judge also ruled that Anna J. is not the child's

natural mother and has no parental rights.

(R.T. 1500.)

Anna J.

appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
Division Three.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the

-superior Court below.
(1991).

ann;. .7. v. Mark_C^, 6 Cal. App. 4th 521

Anna J. was granted review by this court.
Statement of Facts

Mark and Crispina C. are a married couple.

(R.T. 1481.)

Because of a hysterectomy, Crispina is unable to bear a child,
but her ovaries are healthy and she is able to produce healthy
eggs.

(R.T. 1200.)

Despite Crispina's inability to carry a

fetus, the C.'s desired to have a child and investigated the
possibility of a surrogacy arrangement.

(R.T. 1201.)

Anna J. is a nurse at western-Medical Center, as is Crispina
C.

(R.T. 784.)

daughter.

Anna has never married, but she has one natural

(R.T. 786.)- In April 1989 Anna looked into serving as

a surrogate.

(R.T. 781.)

Upon hearing that the C.'s were

looking for a surrogate, Anna volunteered her services.

784.)

2

(R.T.

The surrogacy arrangement called for a child to be conceived
of Mark C.'s sperm and Crispina C.'s egg, and for the zygote to
be implanted in Anna J.'s womb, where it would grow until birth.
(C.T. 11-30.)

At that time, Mark and Crispina C., the genetic

pareivts, would assume custody of their child.

(R.T. 831-)

Anna

J. was to be paid a $10,000 stipend in installments, and her
uninsured medical expenses were to be reimbursed.

(C.T. 31.)

In

addition, the C.'s offered to purchase a life insurance policy
for Anna J., with Anna J.'s daughter as beneficiary.
72.)

(R.T. 768-

The agreement between the C.'s and Anna J. was reduced to a

written contract and executed on January 15, 1990.

(C.T. 11-32.)

Before this surrogacy arrangement, Anna J. suffered several
•miscarriages.

(R.T. 786).

However, the C.'s did not learn about

the miscarriages until after their child was implanted.
1213.)

(R.T.

Approximately seven months after implantation, Anna sent

a letter to the C.'s demanding early payment of her remaining
stipend, with a threat to refuse to transfer custody of the baby
to the C.'s.

(C.T. 33-35.)

Anna claimed in her letter that she

needed the money early because her landlord was selling her house
and she would have to move.
had asked her to move out,

(C.T. 33.)

In fact, Anna's roommate

(R.T. 1314), and Anna owed a

substantial welfare fraud debt,

(R.T. 806-07, 1311-12).

A baby boy was delivered on September 19, 1990.
1482.)

(R.T.

He was identified on his birth certificate as Baby Boy

J., but the C.'s named him Christopher.

(R.T. 1301.)

Human

Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) blood tests confirm that Mark and
crispina C. are the genetic parents of Christopher, and prove
that Anna J. is not the genetic mother.

3

(R.T. 1482-83.)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Are a husband and wife who conceive a child through in

vitro fertilization, and who, because they are unable to carry
that child themselves, enlist the assistance of a gestational
surrogate, the exclusive natural and legal parents under the
Uniform Parentage Act?
2.

Do parents who strive to maintain a parental

relationship with their genetic offspring have a constitutional
right to be legally held the natural and legal parents?
3.

Is it sound public policy to hold a married couple who

enlists the assistance of a gestational surrogate the exclusive
natural and legal parents of their genetic offspring?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mark and Crispina C. are the natural and legal parents of
Christopher, because they are his genetic parents and he was
conceived with the intention that Mark and Crispina C. be his
genetic parents.
The Uniform Parentage Act, as codified in California as
sections 7000 through 7021 of the Civil Code, applies to this
case and establishes Mark and Crispina C. as the genetic,
natural, and legal parents of Christopher.

According to the

intent of the parties and California law, Mark C, is not a sperm
donor and Crispina C. is not an egg donor.

In fact, their status

as natural and legal parents is entirely consistent with the
scheme of the Uniform Parentage Act.
In addition, Mark and Crispina C. have a constitutional
right to be declared the natural and legal parents of
Christopher.

The C.'s have a liberty interest in being the legal

4

parents of their genetic child, because they have never acted to
abandon their parental roles.

Because Mark C. is not a sperm

donor and is therefore the legal father, equal protection
requires that Crispina C. is the legal mother, because she is
situated similarly.

Anna J.'s privacy right concerning her body

during her pregnancy does not extend to a parental right after
California is constitutionally entitled to determine

pregnancy.

that a married couple who are genetic parents are natural and
legal parents, and that a gestational surrogate is not a legal
parent.
The statutory and constitutional determination that Mark and
Crispina C. are the natural and legal parents of Christopher is
also the soundest policy.

Parental status should be determined

by the intent to create and raise a child.

Legislative acts by

our state and by our sister states support this policy.
It is therefore just that this Court declare Mark, Crispina,
and Christopher C. to be a natural and legal family.
ARGUMENT
Are you my mommy?

This deceptively simple question

defies simple answer in the age of modern reproductive
technology.
We have a technology that takes [Crispina's]^ egg and
places it into [Anna's] body.
[S]o we may ask, who is
the mommy? Who is the surrogate? Is [Anna]
substituting for [Crispina's] body, growing
[Crispina's] baby for her?, or is [Crispina's] egg
substituting for [Anna's], growing into [Anna's] baby
in [Anna's] body?

’ Parties* names are substituted for the hypothetical names in the
original article.
5

B. Katz-Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology & Technology in
a Patriarchal Society. 44 (1989)

(quoted in John L. Hill, Wh^

noes it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis
fnr Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 388 (1991)).
Up until now when courts have been asked to determine the
custody of a child there has been no question as to who is the
child's "natural” mother.

Anna J., 6 Cal. App- 4th at 525.

case squarely presents the novel question:

This

who is the child s

"natural”, and therefore, "legal" mother under California law in
a case of gestational surrogacy?

It is a case of first

impression for California and the entire country.
The traditional understanding is that a woman who gives
birth to a child is that child's natural mother.

However, where

as here a child is begotten through the modern reproductive
technology of gestational surrogacy, the matter is not so clear.
Here the natural parents are Mark and Crispina C, , who
carefully and intentionally orchestrated the procreational act,
bringing together all the necessary components with the intention
of creating a unique individual whom they intend to raise as
their own.
The facts of the case are undisputed, and this appeal solely
raises questions of law.
T

■

ACCORDING TO THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, MARK AND CRISPINA
C. THE GENETIC PARENTS OF CHRISTOPHER, ARE HIS NATURE AND
LEGAL PARENTS, AND THEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER
COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Questions of law are reviewed under the non-deferential de

novo or independent standard of review.
3d 969, 985 (1986).

6

People v. Louis, 42 Cal.

A.

The Uniform Parentage Act On Its Face Supports The
Trial Court's Findings That Anna J. Is Not
Christopher *s Natural Mother. Because The Act Defines
Parentage By The Undisputed Blood Test Results Which
Prove Anna J. Has No Genetic Relationship To
Christopher.

The parent and child relationship in California is ~
determined by operation of the Uniform Parentage Act (Act),
adopted by the California Legislature in 1975.
§§ 7000-7021 (West Supp, 1992).

Cal. Civ. Code

The Act*s stated purpose is to

eliminate the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
children in California and create rights and duties associated
with the parent-child relationship without regard to such
distinctions.

See Legis. Counsel's Dig. of SB 347 (1975 Reg.

Sess.).
The Act defines the "parent and child relationship" as "the
legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or
adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes
rights, privileges, duties, and obligations.

It includes the

mother and child relationship and the father and child
relationship."

Cal. Civ. Code § 7001 (West Supp. 1992).

Because

Mark and Crispina C. are the genetic parents of Christopher, they
are the "natural" parents of Christopher, and therefore his legal
parents under the Act,
Before it was possible for one woman to carry another
woman's fertilized egg, the woman who gave birth to the child was
the child's natural and genetic mother.

The Act recognizes this

biological fact:

"The parent and child relationship mav be

established . . .

[b]etween a child and the natural mother . . .

by proof of her having given birth to the child . . .

Cal.

7
i

Civ. Code § 7003(1)

(West Supp. 1992)

(emphasis added).^

The

statute says that motherhood "may be" established by giving
birth.

It does not say "is established" or "shall be

established."

"'Shall* is mandatory and 'may* is permissive."

Cal.'Tvid. Code § 11 (West Supp. 1992).

Furthermore, section

7003(1) completes the sentence with "or under this part."

Giving

birth is only one way that status as a legal mother can be
established in California.

See Hill, supra, at 370 (gestation is

not the sine qua non of motherhood) .
Historically, status as a genetic or natural father has been
more difficult to determine than status as a genetic or natural
mother, because the identity of the man who fertilized the
-woman's egg is not always known at birth.

The Act provides for

various means of determining who is a natural father, and
"[i]nsofar as practicable," these provisions apply to determine
who is a natural mother.

Cal. Civ. Code § 7015 (West Supp.

1992)

^

The full section provides:
The parent and child relationship may be established as
follows:
(1) Between a child and the natural mother it may be
established by proof of her having given birth to the
child, or under this part.
(2) Between a child and the natural father it may be
established under'this part.
(3) Between a child and an adoptive parent it may be
established by proof of adoption.

Id.
^
"Any interested party may bring an action to_determine the
existence or nonexistence of a mother and child_relationship.
Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this part applicable to
the father and child relationship apply." Id. (emphasis added).

8

According to the Act, giving birth does not conclusively
determine the natural mother.

The fundamental rule of statutory

interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent.
aston. 39 cal. 3d 481, 489 (1985).

To determine intent, courts

look fTrst to the words themselves.
3d 1002, 1007 (1987).

People v.

People__v. Woodhead, -43 Cal.

If the statutory language is clear and

unambiguous the plain meaning of the statute must be followed.
r-;.lifnrnia Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego Community College Dist^,

28 cal. 3d 692, 698 (1981).

However, it is "presumed that the

Legislature adopts legislation with the intent and meaning
expressed in committee reports."

Southland Mechanical

r-,.„..1-rnctors Coro. V. Nixen, 119 Cal. App. 3d 417, 427 (1981),
nverruled on other grounds by Laird v. Blacker, 2 Cal. 4th 606,
617 (1992).

The committee reports accompanying the adoption of

the Act state that the Act "cover[s] the rare case in which there
may be uncertainty as to the mother, [as] the bill [SB 347]
provides a procedure whereby the mother may be determined."

See

Legis. counsel's Dig. of SB 347 cmt. 3, at 15 (1975 Reg. Sess.)Where the genetic mother does not give birth, there is
uncertainty as to the identity of the mother, and the Act
applies.
Governor Wilson's recent veto of the Alternative
Reproduction Act of 1992 provides additional support for this
conclusion.

The governor acts in a legislative capacity when

considering bills passed by the Legislature and presented to him
for approval or veto, and his public statements on such bills are
pertinent to the subject of legislative intent.
Tanner. 24 Cal. 3d 514, 520 (1979).

9

See People v..

In his veto message.

Governor Wilson said that "surrogate parenting can be governed by
the legal framework already established in the family law area."
Bill Ainsworth, Ban On Surrogacy Vowed As Regulations Are Vetoed,
The Recorder, Sept. 29, 1992, at 1.

The Governor*s statement

supports the conclusion that the Act applies to the present case.
According to the Act, "[a] man is presumed to be the natural
father of a child if he meets the conditions as set forth in
Section 621 of the Evidence Code . . .
§ 7004(a)

(West Supp. 1992).

Cal. Civ, Code

Taking section 7015 and section

7004(a) together, section 621 of the Evidence Code determines the
natural mother.

Section 621(a) of the Evidence Code provides:

"Except as provided in subdivision (b) , the issue of a wife
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage."
Code § 621(a)

(West Supp. 1992).

Cal. Evid.

Christopher is the genetic

issue of Mark and Crispina C, , who are married and cohabiting.
Therefore, Christopher is conclusively presumed to be a child of
Mark and Crispina C.'s marriage.
Section 621(b) of the Evidence Code provides for rebuttal of
section 621(a)'s presumption by blood test evidence.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a) , if the court
finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as
disclosed by the evidence based upon blood tests
performed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with
Section 890) of Division 7, are that the husband is not
the father of the child, the question of paternity of
the husband shall be resolved accordingly.
Cal. Evid. Code § 621(b)

(West Supp. 1992)

(emphasis added).

In

the case of Mark and Crispina C. , blood tests confirm that they
are the genetic and natural parents.

(C.T. 666; R.T. 1482.)

Therefore, under both sections 621(a) and (b) of the Evidence
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code, Mark and Crispina c. are the natural parents of
Christopher.
Section 621(e) of the Evidence Code does not contradict this
conclusion.

Section 621(e) provides:

"Subdivision (b) shall not

apply to any case coming within Section 7005 of the Civil Code,
or to any case in which the wife, with the consent of the
husband, conceived by means of a surgical procedure."
Code § 621(e)

(West Supp. 1992).

apply to Mark and Crispina C.

Cal. Evid.

First, section 621(e) does not

Section 7005 of the Civil Code and

section 621(e) of the Evidence Code concern the parent-child
relationship in the case of a sperm donor or an egg donor.
Neither Mark nor Crispina is a donor.

See infra, part I.B.

Second, even if section 621(e) did apply to this case, it would
merely deny the application of section 621(b) and make section
621(a) control.

Section 621(a) declares that one spouse is

presumed to be the parent of the other spouse's issue.
neither impotent nor sterile.

Mark is

Christopher is the issue of both

Mark and Crispina, who cohabit as husband and wife.
Anna J. argues that section 7003(a) establishes herself as
the natural mother because she gave birth to the child.
Historically, a woman who gave birth to a child was the natural
mother because she was also the genetic mother.
blood test results prove otherwise, they control.

However, where
When specific

provisions contradict general provisions in the law, specific
provisions control.

County of Santa Clara v. Deputy Sheriff's

Ass'n. No. S023350, 1992 WL 314002 at *5 (Cal. Nov. 2, 1992); San
Francisco Taxpayers Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 2 Cal. 4th
571, 577 (1992); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1859 (West Supp. 1992)
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("when a general and more particular provision are inconsistent,
the latter is paramount to the former”).
B.

Mark And Crispina C« Are Not Germ Cell Donors And Are
Therefore Christopher’s Natural And Legal Parents.

Anna J. argues that section 7005 conclusively precludes Mark
C. from being Christopher’s natural father because he is a sperm
donor.

Section 7005 states that "the donor of semen provided to

a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a
woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were
not the natural father of a child thereby conceived."
Code § 7005(b)

(West Supp. 1992).

Cal. Civ,

Anna misstates the facts.

Mark C. is not a semen donor.
Mark gave his semen to a physician so that the egg of his
wife could be fertilized and implanted in Anna J. , enabling Mark
and Crispina to have a child genetically related to them both.
(C.T. 8, 14.)

Mark never intended to be a "donor,"

terms, section 7005 does not apply to this situation.

By its very
Mark C,

did not "donate" any semen to inseminate a woman not his wife.
Mark’s wife, Crispina, is the woman whose egg was inseminated.
Section 7005 provides individuals with legal means to obtain
semen without fear that the donor might claim paternity, and
provides semen donors with legal protection enabling them to
donate their semen without fear of liability for child support.
Jhordan C. v. Mary K. . 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392 (1986).
The Legislature adopted this interpretation by choosing not
to alter section 7005 when it amended the statute in 1990 and
1991.

The reenactment of a statute in substantially the same

language after it has been judicially construed gives rise to a
presumption of legislative adoption, acquiescence, or

ratification of that construction.

Holmes v. McColgant 17 Cal.

2d 426 (1941); Marina Point Ltd, v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 734
(1982).

"[T]he Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing

laws and judicial decisions in effect at the time legislation is
[amend^] and to have . . . amended statutes in light of -such
decisions as have a direct bearing upon them."
Overstreet, 42 Cal. 3d 891, 897 (1986).

People v.

Therefore, the

Legislature, being deemed aware of the interpretation enunciated
in .Thordan C. when it amended the law in 1990 and 1991, and not
having made any relevant changes, must be presumed to have
approved or ratified such interpretation.
Because Mark and Crispina C. intended to be the legal
parents when they combined their sperm and eggs, they are not
donors.
C.

Finding Mark And Crispina C. The Natural And Legal
Parents Of Christopher Is Consistent With The Entire
Scheme Of The Uniform Parentage Act^

"Statutes should be construed so as to harmonize with the
entire scheme of law."

Clean Air Constituency v. California

state Air Resource Bd., 11 Cal, 3d 801, 814 (1974).
The old common law rule, that a child of a wife cohabiting
with her husband shall be conclusively presumed the child of the
marriage, served to ensure the legitimization of the child in an
era when illegitimacy carried with it terrible social stigma and
severe legal consequences.

Hill, supra, at 373.

"[A]ppeals to traditional definitions are of little use in
answering what is essentially a normative question:

who should

be considered the parent in collaborative-reproduction
arrangements?"

at 373.

The common use of a term may be
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ambiguous, lacking clear boundaries, and have conflicting
meanings.

Id. at 361.

For the phrase "natural mother" the very

fact that common usage is unclear in cases arising under modern
reproductive technology makes reliance on such usage in this case
particularly unwise.

~

"[T]he problem with finding a purely formal definition of
'parent* is that the formal definition ignores the social, moral,
and legal contingencies which have shaped our social intuitions
about parenthood."

Id. at 362.

For example, in our society

adoptive parents are legal parents.

A child's adoptive mother is

considered her actual and legal mother even though the adoptive
mother does not satisfy the common law or traditional definition
-of mother that Anna J. would have the Court apply to this case.
This argument is lacking in substance and ultimately begs the
question of motherhood under these facts.
The Act was adopted to eradicate the stigmas associated with
illegitimacy.

Legis. Counsel's Dig. of SB 347 (1975 Reg. Sess.).

Subsequently, the conclusive presumption of legitimacy was
modified to incorporate modern reproductive technology (e.g.,
artificial insemination) into the scheme of the law.

California

Evidence Code section 621 first subordinates the presumption of
legitimacy to blood test results proving that the alleged parent
has no genetic link to the child, and second requires a finding
of non-parenthood in such a case.

See Cal. Evid. Code § 621

(West Supp. 1992).
The Act expressly allows for the modern reproductive
technology of artificial insemination.

The Legislature has

expressed itself about one procedure for medically assisted
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conception while remaining silent about others.

To this extent

the Legislature puts its stamp of approval on using modern
reproductive technologies to assist childless couples to
conceive.

The fact that the statute expressly sanctions one way

of doTng this does not rule out other ways by implication.
Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth. 704 S.W.2d 209, 212
(Ky. 1986)

(holding surrogate contract not violative of state law

prohibiting payment of money for adoption) .

Finding Mark and

Crispina C. the legal parents of Christopher is consistent with
this scheme of the law as set out in the Act.
II.

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THIS COURT
DECLARE MARK AND CRISPINA C. THE NATURAL AND LEGAL PARENTS
OF CHRISTOPHER.
Constitutional considerations require a finding that Mark

and Crispina C. are the natural and legal parents of Christopher
under the Uniform Parentage Act.
The court must interpret a statute in a manner consistent
with the federal Constitution.

California Housing Fin. Agency v.

Elliott, 17 Cal. 3d 575, 594 (1976).

The Constitution guarantees

parental rights for genetic parents unless they act to relinquish
those rights or they are proved unfit.

Further, because Mark C.

is unquestionably a genetic, natural, and legal parent of
Christopher, equal protection doctrine guarantees that his wife
Crispina C. is also a genetic, natural, and legal parent of
Christopher.

Anna J. has no constitutional claim to be adjudged

a natural or legal parent because she is not a genetic parent.
Even if Anna J. did have constitutionally protected interests,
the Constitution would not be offended by California*s
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determination that Mark and Crispina C. are the natural and legal
parents of Christopher.
A.

Mark And Crispina C. Must Be Declared The Natural And
Legal Parents Of Christopher, Because The Fourteenth
Amendment To The United States Constitution Guarantees
Parental Rights To Married Genetic Parents, Absent
Relinquishment Of Parental Rights Or Clear And—
Convincing Evidence Of Unfitness.

The Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to marry and
have children.

It guarantees parental rights to genetic parents

unless they sleep on their rights or are found to be unfit.
Liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes,
'■[w]ithout doubt,
to marry,

. . . the right of the individual to contract,

[and to] establish a home and bring up children,

|4g>Yer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)

(holding

unconstitutional a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of
foreign languages to young children) ; see al^ Cleveland Bd. of
PHnr-.

V.

LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)

(holding

unconstitutional requirements that pregnant teachers take leaves
of absence four or five months before expected delivery)
(“freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment").*
Marriage and family are our society's most important
institutions.
Marriage is a coming together for bettor or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way ot
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political

‘ "NO State shall . . • deprive any person of . . . liberty . . .
without due process of law
V.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
California's constitutional protection is similar:
"A person may
not be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law
. . .
Cal. Const, art. 1, § 7(a).
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faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects.
r,riswold V- Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).

"[T]he

Constitution protects the sanctity of the family . . • because
the instritution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation*s
history and tradition.

It is through the family that we

inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral
and cultural."
(1977)

Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04

(holding unconstitutional a city ordinance prohibiting a

grandmother from living with her two grandsons who were cousins) .
The Constitution protects procreative rights.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)

Skinner v.

(holding unconstitutional

Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act); Stanley y^,
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)

(holding unconstitutional an

Illinois presumption that unwed fathers are unfit parents).
Interfering with the reproductive choices of a married couple is
"repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship."

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485—86.

The Constitution protects the relationship between a parent
and genetic offspring.
(1973)

Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38

(holding unconstitutional a Texas common-law rule that

only natural fathers of legitimate children may be held liable
for the children's support); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 753 (1982)

(finding a "fundamental liberty interest of

natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their
child").

For example, in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979),

Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived together unmarried and had
two children.

Id^ at 382.

Mohammed took the children to live

with another man, whom she married.

Id^

Caban also married, and
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both couples endeavored to adopt the children.

Id. at 383.

The

United states Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York
statute requiring consent of only the mother of illegitimate
children- in adoption, thereby protecting the parental rights of a
genetic father.

Id. at 382.

The California Supreme Court recently affirmed the
constitutional right to a relationship with genetic offspring in
an adoption case.
(1992).

Adoption of Kelsev S. . 1 Cal. 4th 816, 821

Kari S. and Rickie M. had a child out of wedlock and

Kari sought to relinquish the child for adoption by another
couple.

Id. at 821-22.

The California Supreme Court determined

that Rickie had a right under the federal Constitution to
withhold his consent to the adoption.

Id. at 849.

"The

biological connection between father and child is unique and
worthy of constitutional protection if the father grasps the
opportunity to develop that biological connection into a full and
enduring relationship."

Id. at 838.

Children may be removed from genetic parents who are married
to each other only upon clear and convincing evidence of
unfitness.

Santoskv. 455 U.S. at 747-48.

Absent a showing of

unfitness, the United States Supreme Court has never ruled
against the interests of a genetic parent, except in favor of the
other genetic parent and her husband.

Anna J. is not a genetic

parent and she has no husband.
Leon Quilloin and Ardell Walcott had a child out of wedlock.
Ouilloin V. Walcott. 434 U.S. 246, 247, reh'q denied, 435 U.S,
918 (1978) .

They never established a home together and Walcott

always retained custody of their child.

Id.

Walcott

subsequently married another man, who wished to adopt her son.
Id.

The United States Supreme Court upheld Georgia's denial of

Quilloin's petition to block the adoption, noting that he never
attempted to legitimize the child until the child was eleven
years old and Walcott petitioned to adopt her.

Id. at 248^1.

The Court expressed a strong preference for families to be
composed of married couples and their children.

Id_^ at 255.

Jonathan Lehr and Lorraine Robertson conceived a child,
Jessica, out of wedlock.
(1983).

Lehr v. Robertson. 463 U.S. 248, 250

Lorraine subsequently married another man who wished to

adopt the child.

Id.

The adoption was approved by New York's

Family Court, and Lehr challenged the adoption because he was not
given notice of the proceedings.

Id.

The New York courts

determined that notice was not required because Lehr never
established a substantial relationship with Jessica, nor did he
register his status as father with New York's putative father
registry.

Id. at 250-52.

The United States Supreme Court held

New York's determinations constitutional.

Id. at 268.

Nevertheless, the Court found a constitutional parental
interest in the genetic father.
The intangible fibers that connect parent and
child have infinite variety. ... It is self-evident
that they are sufficiently vital to merit
constitutional protection in appropriate cases. . . .
•

•

•

•

The significance of the biological connection is
that it offers the natural father an opportunity that
no other male possesses to develop a relationship with
his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and
accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's
future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions
to the child's development.

Id. at 256, 262.

New York afforded Lehr adequate protection of

his constitutional rights.

"Whereas [Robertson] had a continuous

custodial responsibility for Jessica, [Lehr] never established
any custodial, personal or financial relationship with her."
at 267,

Id._

Mark and Crispina C.*s constitutional parental interests

are greater than Lehr's.

From even before the moment of

conception, the C.'s assumed responsibilities for their son's
future.

They never slept on their rights, moving for declaratory

relief immediately upon receiving Anna J.'s threat to withhold
their child.
In Michael H. five members of the United States Supreme
Court recognized the constitutionally protected interest of a
■genetic parent in a parent-child relationship.

Michael H. was

the genetic father of Victoria, who was conceived with Carole D.
through sexual intercourse while Carole D. was married to Gerald
D.

Michael H. v. Gerald D. . 491 U.S. 110, 113, reh'g denied, 492

U.S. 937 (1989), and reh'g denied. Ill S. Ct. 1645 (1991), and
motion to amend or clarify denied. 112 S, Ct. 1931 (1992).
Michael was precluded by California law from establishing a
parent-child relationship with Victoria.
Evid. Code § 621(a)

(West Supp. 1992)

Id.,, at 115;

Cal.

("the issue of a wife

cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage").

Only four

justices determined the result to be constitutional because they
found that a genetic father who conceived a child with a woman
married to another man had no constitutionally protected parental
interest.

Michael H. . 491 U.S. at 113-32 (plurality opinion

by Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Kennedy,

jj., joining).

Another four justices determined that

California’s conclusive presumption was unconstitutional.

See

id, at 136-57 (Brennan, J. , dissenting, with Marshall and
Blackmun, JJ., joining); i^ at 157-63 (White, J. , dissenting,
with Brennan, J. , joining).

The deciding vote was from Justice

Stevens, who recognized a potential constitutional interest in
Michael H.'s relationship with Victoria, but determined that the
trial court had adequately considered awarding him visitation
rights.

Id. at 132-36 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).

The California Supreme Court found that *'a majority of the
justices [in Michael H. 1 were solicitous of the rights of unwed
biological fathers.

For them, the determinative factor was

whether a biological father has attempted to establish a
relationship with his child."

Kelsey S. . 1 Cal. 4th at 837.

"If

an unwed father promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full
commitment to his parental responsibilities—emotional,
financial, and otherwise—his federal constitutional right to due
process prohibits the termination of his parental relationship
absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent."

Id^ at 849.

If

anything, the constitutional rights of a genetic parent are even
greater when that person is married to the other genetic parent,
as is the case with Mark and Crispina C.
The California Court identified the following as important
factors:

"the father’s public acknowledgement of paternity,

payment of pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate with his
ability to do so, and prompt legal action to seek custody of the
child."
(1984)

Id. ; see also In re Babv Girl M. , 37 Cal. 3d 65, 73-75
(recognizing constitutional parental rights of a genetic
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father so long as he maintains a relationship with the child and
is not found unfit); Jermstad v. McNeils, 210 Cal. App. 3d 528,
551 (1989)

(finding constitutional parental rights in a genetic

father who promptly acknowledges paternity and seeks custody of
the child).
Mark and Crispina C. have publicly and consistently
maintained their status as the genetic parents of Christopher.
Anna J. concedes as much.

The C.*s have never shirked their

financial responsibilities toward Christopher.

They only balked

at Anna J, 's attempts to extort additional funds to satisfy her
welfare obligations.

The C.'s efforts to secure their legal

rights as parents of Christopher have been prompt and tenacious.
5^

The Equal Protection Clause Requires That—Crispina—C_^
Rp npclared The Nai-nral And Legal Mother Of
rhristopher. Because She Is Similarly Situated To Mark
C.. Christopher's Natural And Legal—Father,^.

There is no genuine question about whether Mark C. is the
genetic, natural, and legal father of Christopher.

Christopher

was conceived with Mark's sperm with the intention of all parties
that he act as father in raising the child.
sperm donor.

Mark C. is not a

See supra, Part I.B.

in the "first surrogate parenting case to reach a California
appellate court," the surrogate was both gestational host and
genetic mother,

adoption of Matthev^, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239,

1250 (1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1685 (1992).

The Court of

Appeal ruled that denying the genetic father (Timothy) parental
rights would be unconstitutional.

M. at 1273.

"Timothy's

private interest stems from both his biological connection to
Matthew and his conduct as Matthew's father.

Matthew was

conceived with the intention that Timothy would raise him, and
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Timothy has faithfully carried out his responsibility.”

Id.

The

appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the
surrogate's petition to withdraw her consent to the adoption of
Matthew by Timothy's wife.

at 1251.

In a surrogacy

arrangement, the genetic father is the natural and legal ^ther.
The Equal Protection Clause requires that Crispina C. be
found to be the natural and legal mother because she is similarly
situated to her husband Mark.^
A legal preference for one sex over the other is "the very
kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)

Reed v.—Reed,

(holding unconstitutional an Idaho statute

favoring males over females in appointing administrators of
estates).

"[C]lassifications by gender must serve important

governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."
197 (1976)

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,

(holding unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds

an Oklahoma statute that set the age limit for purchase of 3.2%
beer at 18 for females and 21 for males), reh'g deni^, 435 U.S.
918 (1978); see also Michelle W. v. Ronald W^, 39 Cal. 3d 354
(1985)

(holding constitutional the denial of a stepfather's

petition to prove himself the genetic father, because the child
had already established a relationship with her mother's former
husband)

("a sovereign may not subject men and women to disparate

5 "No state shall - . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
"A person may not be . . . denied equal protection of the laws
. .
Cal. Const, art. 1, § 7(a). California's constitutional
guarantee of equal protection is essentially the same as the
federal constitutional guarantee. Cohan v. Alvord, 162 Cal. App.
3d 176, 181 (1984).
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treatment where there is no substantial relationship between the
classification and an important governmental purpose”), appeal
dismissed. 474 U.S. 1043 (1986).
In Lehr. the United States Supreme Court recognized that
equal protection requires that genetic fathers and geneticmothers be treated similarly if situated similarly aside from
gender.

Lehr. 463 U.S. at 265-67.

The Court has also held that

requiring consent of mothers, but not fathers, in the adoption of
illegitimate children violates equal protection.

Caban. 441 U.S.

at 382.
Crispina C. is situated differently from women in surrogacy
arrangements where the husband is the genetic father and the
surrogate is the genetic mother.

For example, in the celebrated

Baby M. case, William and Elizabeth Stern arranged for Mary Beth
Whitehead to be artificially inseminated with William*s sperm.
In re Baby M. . 109 N.J. 396, 411-14, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235-36
(1988) .

The New Jersey court found that both William and

Whitehead were the child's natural and legal parents, but
affirmed an award of custody to the Sterns.

Id. at 445, 459.

The court acknowledged the validity of an equal protection
argument for the genetic mother's parental rights if a fertilized
egg were implanted in another woman's body.

Id^ at 4 50.

The Equal Protection Clause requires that contributors of
both the sperm and the egg in the creation of a child are natural
and legal parents, unless they duly relinquish their rights.
C.

Anna J. Does Not Have A Constitutional Right To Be
Declared A Natural Parent Of Christopher^

Although Anna J.'s contribution to the development of
Christopher was significant, and although she retained a privacy
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interest in the pregnancy, she is not constitutionally entitled
to parental status.
The United States Constitution implicitly guarantees various
zones of privacy.

Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (a woman's

right-to terminate her pregnancy), reh'a denied. 410 U.S._959
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972)

(dissemination

and use of contraceptives); Griswold. 381 U.S. at 484 (same).
The California Constitution guarantees privacy expressly.
Conservatorship of Valerie N. . 40 Cal. 3d 143, 161 (1986).*

The

right of privacy protected by cases such as Roe is the freedom
from "compulsion to carry a fetus to term, to deliver the baby,
and to care for the child in the first years of its life,"

Jed

Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy. 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 789
(1989)

(arguing that constitutional privacy analysis must look to

what the law requires a person to do, not to what the law
prevents a person from doing).

The right to physical autonomy

during pregnancy does not include the right to withhold a child
from his genetic parents when those parents have actively
maintained their parental interests.

See also Baby

109 N.J.

at 448, 537 A.2d at 1253 ("The custody, care, companionship, and
nurturing that follow child birth are not parts of the right to
procreation ....").
Anna J. argues that her biological investment in
Christopher, owing to her bearing and nourishing the child for
nine months, gives her parental rights.

But parental rights are

*
"All people are by nature free and independent and
inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."
Const, art. 1, § 1.
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have
life
and
Cal.

not determined on unjust enrichment theories.

The "immediate

right to the care, custody, management and companionship of . . .
minor children [is] far more precious . . . than property
rights."

May v. Anderson. 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)

(holding that

a mother-in Ohio is not bound by the Full Faith and Credit_Clause
to honor an ex parte Wisconsin decree awarding custody of
children to the father).

Anna J.'s physiological sacrifice in

bearing Christopher was admittedly considerable, but it does not
deprive the C.*s of parental rights with respect to their child,
nor does it confer parental status upon Anna J.
Of course, there are different circumstances in which a
court will protect the parental rights of a birth mother.

For

•example, in Tn re Timothy W. , 223 Cal. App. 3d 437 (1990), the
Court of Appeal recognized the fundamental right of a birth
mother to raise her child, id. at 446-47, holding that when a
mother releases her infant to the care of prospective adoptive
parents, but has not yet relinquished the child for adoption, she
retains the right to reclaim the child, id • 3t 441.

Th

circumstances of Alyssa W., the birth mother in Timothy, were
very different from Anna J.*s.
mother.

Alyssa was Timothy's genetic

Furthermore, neither of the prospective adoptive parents

in Timothy was genetically related to Timothy.
Nor .is Anna J. afforded parental rights under the Equal
Protection Clause.
or Crispina C,

She is not situated similarly to either Mark

True, both Crispina and Anna contributed

physiologically to the development of Christopher, and both are
women.

But only Crispina is the genetic mother.

She has an
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independent constitutional right to parental status, and an equal
protection right to the same status as Mark's.
Anna J. has no constitutionally protected interest in being
declared the legal parent of Christopher.

The right to privacy

does not confer upon a woman the right to terminate parental
rights of genetic parents even if she carries and gives birth to
their child.

Nor does a gestational surrogate have parental

rights equivalent to a genetic mother's by equal protection,
because the two women are not similarly situated.
D.

Even If The Constitution Confers Parental Rights On
Anna J.. The State Of California May Determine That
Mark And Crisoina C. Are The Natural Parents Of
Christopher.

Even if Anna J. has constitutional parental rights, the
parental rights of Mark and Crispina C. are not diminished.
santoskv, 455 U.S. at 754 n.7 (the fact that foster parents'
rights may be affected does not justify denial of parental rights
to natural parents).
Recognizing the parental rights of Mark and Crispina C. is
consistent with opinions expressed by all justices in Michael H_^,
491 U.S. 110.

First, four justices explicitly found a

constitutional interest in a genetic parent, id. at 141-42
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting),
and a fifth justice acknowledged there could be such a
relationship, id. at 133 (Stevens, J. , concurring).

Second, even

the justices who did not recognize a constitutional right in a
genetic parent determined that the State of California was
entitled to determine the legal right of a.genetic parent.
at 118-30 (plurality opinion by Scalia, J.).

The court did not

find any constitutional right superior to that of a genetic
27

Id.

parent.

Third, both the trial court in Michael H. and the trial

court in this case awarded parental rights to a married couple,
thus promoting, the "unitary family."

See id. at 123.

Granting parental rights to Mark and Crispina C. is
constitutionally acceptable.

“

III. PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES THAT MARK AND CRISPINA C. BE
EXCLUSIVELY DECLARED THE NATURAL AND LEGAL PARENTS OF
CHRISTOPHER.
Infertility affects one in six American couples of
reproductive age, and this figure is expected to increase.
Ziporyn,

Terra

'Artificial* Human ^Reproduction Poses Medical.,_Social

concerns, 255 JAMA 13 (1986); Developments in the Law—Medical
TPchnoloav and the Law. 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1519, 1546 (1990).

We

-now live in an era where a child may have as many as five
different potential parents.

These include a sperm donor, an egg

donor, a surrogate or gestational host, and two non-biologically
related individuals who intend to raise the child.
at 355.

Hill, supra,

It is often the case that developments in the law are

outpaced by developments in science.

Given the current and

potential developments of modern reproductive technology, the
courts must help guide our journey through this brave new world.
A.

Parental Status Should Attach To The Persons Who Have
Sought. Bv Whatever Means They Could Marshal,_To Cause
A Child To Be Born So That They Could Raise It And Care
For It.

"[Wjith new conditions there must be new rules .

. ,

Benjamin N. Cardozo, Nature of Judicial Process 163 (1947).
When [statutory] language is susceptible of more than
one reasonable interpretation ... we look to a
variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible
objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the
legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous
administrative construction, and the statutory scheme
of which the statute is a part.
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Woodhead. 43 Cal. 3d at 1008.
condition.

Gestational surrogacy is a new

While there is a presumption that the woman from

whose womb a baby emerges is that baby's mother, that presumption
arose before there was any possibility that the source of the egg
and the -source of the womb could be different women.

Furrow, et

al.. Bioethics: Health Care Law and Ethics 122 (1991).
■•'This Court has termed the interest in maintaining a
parent-child relationship a compelling one, ranked
among the most basic civil rights. Freedom from an
incorrect imposition of the relationship on either
parent or a child is an equally compelling interest."
Public policy mandates the use of the most reliable and
objective evidence available to determine the parentage
of a child whose interests are at stake in a disputed
paternity proceeding. Such evidence is usually in the
form of blood tests of the alleged father, the mother,
and the child, which, based upon genetics, either
exclude or include the alleged father in the group of
possible fathers.
Everett v. Everett. 150 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 1064-65 (1984)
(quoting Salas v. Cortez. 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28 (1979)
quotations and citations omitted)).

(internal

That same public policy

mandates the use of the most reliable and objective evidence
available to determine the mother of a child where, as here, the
issue of maternity is disputed.
Surrogacy is gaining in popularity for a variety of reasons.
Scientific advances in the field of reproduction, a societal
shift in conventional attitudes toward sex and the family, and
the apparent shortage of babies for adoption all are reasons for
such popularity.

In short, surrogacy is in demand because people

desire genetic continuity with their offspring and surrogacy
enables them to satisfy that desire.

Richard A. Posner, The

Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate
Motherhood. 5 J. Contemp. Health Pol*y 21, 22 (1989).

29

Women who

are unable to bear children themselves can now maintain genetic
continuity with their offspring through in vitro fertilization
and use of a surrogate.
The increasing use of such technologies has prompted our
sister-states to address the surrogacy issue.

For example-*-

Nevada and Iowa specifically exempt surrogacy contracts from
their general prohibitions against payment for adoptions, thereby
legitimizing the arrangement by implication.

Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 773 (West 1987); Iowa Code Ann. § 710.11 (West 1989).

Arkansas

has enacted legislation specifically determining parental rights
in surrogacy cases, providing that:

"A child born by means of

artificial insemination . . . shall be presumed to be the child
of the woman giving birth . , . except in the case of a surrogate
mother. in which event the child shall be that of:

(1) The

biological father and the woman intended to be the mother if the
father is married, . .

Ark. Stat. Ann. § 9-10-201 (1991)

(emphasis added).
While other states have attacked the validity of the
surrogacy contracts themselves, none has denied parental rights
to the genetic parents.

See, e.g. . La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2713

(West Supp. 1988); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.590 (Baldwin 1988);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21, 200 (1988); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63-212(i)
(West 1988).
When a genetic parent entrusts his or her issue to another
to carry the child to term, the genetic parent maintains a
compelling interest in a relationship with the child.
supra, at 393.

Hill,

Part of what makes parenthood meaningful is the

parent's ability to see her child grow and develop and see
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herself in the process of this growth.

"[A]doption cannot

satisfy the yearning to create the child and to watch as a
version of oneself unfolds and develops,"

Id, at 389,

It is the procreators, Mark and Crispina C., the couple
responsitdr^ for bringing the child into the world with the ~
intention of raising it, the prime movers in the procreative
relationship, who are the parents of the child at birth.
387.

Id. at

They have brought together their sperm and egg through in

vitro fertilization, and they have selected the individual who
will carry the child they intend to raise.

Id. at 414.

Mark and

Crispina are the "first cause in the procreative process."
They have engineered the birth of Christopher.

Id,

The others in the

process are participants only after the intention and actions of
Mark and Crispina, the intended parents to have a child.

While

some gestational host is needed to achieve the intention of the
intended parents, no particular carrier is necessary.

The

gestational tie is only one way in which to bring a child into
the world.

It is not the gestational tie itself which is

fundamental, but the pre-conception intention and the pre- and
post-conception acts which bring the child into existence.

See

Id. at 414-15.
B.

The Alternative Reproduction Act Of 1992 Is Evidence Of
California's Public Policy Accepting Gestational
Surrogacy.

The Alternative Reproduction Act of 1992 is instructive
regarding current public and social policy in California.
Legis. Counsel's Dig. of SB 937 (1991-92 Reg. Sess.).

See

Although

in passing Senate Bill 937, the Legislature felt that existing
law needed clarification to provide for the regulation of the
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process by which infertile persons may become parents through a
surrogate or through the use of a donated egg, the Governor felt
that these situations were adequately covered by existing law.
Ainsworth, supra.
The policy underlying Senate Bill 937 was to expressly allow
surrogacy in California,

The bill contained various provisions

for clearly determining the rights of individuals involved in
surrogacy situations:
(1)

The bill provided:

"[T]he Legislature finds and

declares that surrogate contracts are not against sound
public and social policy."
(2)

The new Civil Code section 7003 would have been amended
to include subdivision (d), establishing the parent and
child relationship "between a child and acknowledged
(intended) mother , , . by a properly executed
surrogate contract."

(3)

Section 7302(d) would have declared:
An ovum donor shall have no parental rights
. . . with regard to any child conceived or
born pursuant to the use of the ovum . . .
except where the ovum donor is the
acknowledged (intended) mother. An . . .
(intended) mother ... is the mother of a
child conceived or born pursuant to the use
of the . . . ovum regardless of whether the
. . . ovum is deposited into her own
reproductive system or [that] of a surrogate.

(4)

Section 7303 would have read:

"The . . .

(intended)

father shall be presumed to be the father of any child
born to a surrogate within 300 days of conception
pursuant to a surrogate contract."
(5)

Section 7306 would have read:

"Payment made to a

surrogate . . . does not constitute a violation of
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section 181 or 273 of the Penal Code" (prohibiting
payment for adoptions or for relinquishments of
parental rights).
(6)

Section 7309 would have read:

—

In the event an . . , (intended) mother's —
ovum ... is used by a surrogate, the ovum
is conclusively presumed to be the ovum of
the . . . (intended) mother and no adoption
is required. Furthermore, the intended
parents shall be conclusively presumed to be
the legal parents. . . . The surrogate . . .
shall have no parental rights to the child.

Legis. Counsel's Dig. of SB 937 (1991-92 Reg. Sess.).
Although the Governor vetoed this bill, he did so on belief
that existing law could adequately govern surrogacy situations.
His veto in no way negated or contradicted the public and social
policies underlying the bill.

The Alternative Reproduction Act

of 1992 passed both the Senate and the Assembly in August of
1992.

The vote in the Senate was 22 in favor, 13 against, while

the vote in the Assembly was 49 in favor and only 19 against.
Senate Weekly History, Oct. 9, 1992, at 244 .

The wide margin by

which the bill passed both legislative houses is indicative of
the strength of the policy determinations contained within the
bill.
C.

In the Absence of Legislation On the Books Declaring
Gestational Surrogacy Impermissible. It Is Not For the
Courts To Cut Off Solutions Offered Bv Science.

A mere one percent of all surrogates change their minds
about relinquishing the child.

Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood:

The Challenge for Feminists. 16 L. Med. & Health Care 72, 74
(1988) .

In contrast, seventy-five percent of the mothers who put

up their children for adoption change their minds and keep the
child.

Id. at 76.

This suggests that giving up a child pursuant
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to a surrogacy agreement, where the surrogate knows before she
becomes pregnant that the child is not hers, causes less distress
than does giving up one's own child to be adopted and raised by
others.
Ij3—medicine, innovations are adopted when there is some
sense that it may be an improvement over the existing treatment
and it will not be likely to cause risks that outweigh its
potential benefits.

A similar approach should be taken in the

law of gestational surrogacy.

The harms that have been posited

thus far about gestational surrogacy are not concrete enough to
require that the procedure be banned.

Presently, most of the

articulated evils are speculative; therefore, this new procedure
should be allowed to continue forward under regulation in order
to assess the harms, if any, that may or may not materialize.
See Lori B. Andrews, Legal and Ethical Aspects of New
Reproductive Technologies. 29 Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology
190, 193 (1986).
Anna J. argues that permitting surrogacy encourages the
exploitation of women, especially poor women.
speculation.

This is mere

There is no evidence that surrogate mothers are

drawn from the ranks of the poor, and it seems unlikely that they
would be.

Posner, supra. at 25.

Moreover, this argument is counterintuitive.

A couple would

be unlikely to want a desperately poor woman to carry their baby;
they would be concerned about both her health and the baby's.
Id.

Anna J. is a well educated professional.

(R.T. 784.)

She

was not exploited or forced by the sweet smell of financial gain.
She volunteered to be a surrogate for the C.'s.
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In fact, it was

Anna who initially approached the C. 's and offered to be their
surrogate.

(R.T. 781-84.)

Modern reproductive technologies are not likely to have a
more devastating effect on the family than any other medical and
social phenomenon.

Given the countless other pressures operating

on the family, the so-called threats of in vitro fertilization
and gestational surrogacy are minuscule.
CONCLUSION
Statutes, constitutions, and public policies converge to
determine that Mark and Crispina C., a married couple and the
genetic parents of Christopher, are the natural and legal parents
of Christopher.

Although Anna J,*s physiological contribution to

the development of Christopher was significant, it does not
warrant invasion of the natural family of Mark, Crispina, and
Christopher C.

Mark and Crispina are the procreators who

engineered the birth of Christopher, the prime movers responsible
for bringing him into this world with the intention of raising
him.

Declaring Mark and Crispina C. the natural and legal

parents of Christopher is both just and legally required.
For the foregoing reasons. Respondents pray this Court to
affirm the Court of Appeal and hold Mark and Crispina C. the
natural and legal parents of Christopher.
Dated:

November 4, 1992.
Respectfully submitted,

Jeffrey B. Linden

Tim Reagan
Counsel for Respondents
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